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The rhetoric and practice of localism has attracted significant support within both political and 
academic circles in the UK in recent years. However, it is the contention of this article that there are, 
or should be, limits to localism as applied to the basic citizenship rights of vulnerable people. Drawing 
on a ten-year, mixed-methods study, we use the example of sharply rising homelessness in England 
to illustrate our argument that localist policymaking has an intrinsic tendency to disadvantage 
socially marginalised groups. While we acknowledge the central role played by austerity in driving 
up homelessness over the past decade, we advance the case that the post-2010 localist agenda of 
successive UK governments has also had an independent and malign effect. At the very least, we 
seek to demonstrate that localism cannot be viewed as a taken-for-granted progressive model, 
with centralism (that is, the consistent implementation of a policy across a whole country) also 
perfectly defensible on progressive grounds in relevant circumstances.
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Introduction
The rhetoric and practice of ‘localism’ has attracted significant support from both 
the political Left and Right in the UK in recent years, with policymaking power 
considered excessively centralised in England, in particular, as compared with other 
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Western European countries (Hildreth, 2011). At its simplest, localism has been 
described as a ‘positive disposition to the decentralization of political power’ (Clarke 
and Cochrane, 2013: 10), with such decentralisation thought to offer a wide range 
of public policy benefits, including ‘diversity and experimentation … learning and 
competition … bring[ing] policymakers closer to people so they are more informed 
and accountable … get[ting] central government out of the details of local policy 
… engag[ing] people in decisions affecting their lives’ (Costa-Font and Greer, 2013: 
2). While some analysts have defended centralism (Walker, 2002), the balance of 
UK academic opinion has tended to be broadly pro-localist (Powell and Boyne, 
2001; Davies, 2008). Concerns have thus focused mainly on the ‘genuineness’ of 
localist initiatives, or their co-option by neoliberal agendas (Deas, 2013), rather than 
in-principle objections to the devolution of power down to lower tiers of government 
or local non-state actors (Hildreth, 2011).
However, it is the contention of this article that there are, or should be, limits 
to localism as applied to the basic citizenship rights of marginalised groups. In the 
inevitable trade-off between local autonomy and horizontal equity (that is, treating 
individuals with similar levels of need living in different places in the same way), some 
authors seem sympathetic to the argument that ‘some degree of inequality may be a 
price worth paying for local democracy’ (Powell and Boyne, 2001: 186). However, we 
argue that the avoidance of harm and the demands of justice should take precedence 
over local political responsiveness when it comes to meeting the fundamental human 
needs of vulnerable people (Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018).
Moreover, we would further venture that there is something intrinsic about localism 
– that is, to policy and priority setting at smaller territorial areas – that will tend to 
be antithetical to the interests of the most socially marginalised groups. Of course, 
we accept that local and regional authorities may sometimes pursue a generally more 
progressive policy line than central government. One only has to review the history 
of UK ‘municipal socialism’ (Davies, 2008), or welfare expansion by Spanish regional 
governments (Costa-Font and Greer, 2013), to observe such instances. However, a 
generally egalitarian political outlook should not be confused with a progressive 
stance towards socially marginalised groups, such as homeless people, ex-offenders, 
those with substance misuse problems and others apt to be viewed as ‘undeserving’ by 
local communities. Indeed, international comparative evidence has found that barriers 
to assistance for such groups can be heightened in egalitarian political communities 
where a particular premium may be placed on social cohesion, behavioural conformity 
and personal responsibility (Fitzpatrick and Stephens, 2014).
In this article, we use the example of sharply rising homelessness in England over 
the past decade to illustrate and explicate our contention that localism has a necessary 
tendency to disadvantage socially marginalised groups. It should be noted that that 
we use the term ‘necessary tendency’ here in the critical realist sense of signalling 
an underlying causal mechanism that may or may not be activated, depending on 
contingent political and other conditions (Sayer, 2000), but is nonetheless ‘real’ and 
should be recognised in developing policy and political strategies to protect vulnerable 
groups.
At the very least, we seek to demonstrate that localism cannot be viewed as a taken-
for-granted progressive model, and must be critically assessed for its actual (as opposed 
to hypothesised or hoped for) outcomes, with centralism also perfectly defensible 
on progressive grounds in relevant circumstances. By focusing on homeless people 
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as an extreme case of a marginalised group, we hope to bring into sharp relief the 
naivety, or cynicism, that lies at the heart of the localist policy agenda, as articulated 
by Jacobs and Manzi (2013: 40–1):
[Localism] is premised on depoliticized notions of community, neighbourhood 
and engagement that overlook the degree to which these neighbourhoods are 
sites of conflicts…. Consensus is rarely achieved, particularly [on] decisions … 
about the availability of scarce resources…. Crucially this requires government 
safeguards that protect against abuse and protection for vulnerable groups 
to ensure social justice and democratic citizenship.
The article proceeds as follows. After detailing our research methods, we summarise 
recent homelessness trends and post-2010 central government policy responses. Next, 
we explore the concept and practical implementation of localism in England, before 
exploring its homelessness implications and consequences. The key counterargument 
is then considered: that austerity, not localism, has driven rising homelessness. We 
conclude by seeking to defend a centralised response to homelessness, or at least a 
response that is steered from central government in certain key respects.
Methods
The article draws on an ongoing ten-year, multi-method study of the homelessness 
impacts of economic and policy change in England (2011–21).1 Since 2011, we have 
annually reviewed policy, legal and research developments on homelessness, housing 
and social security. We have also undertaken face-to-face and telephone interviews with 
senior stakeholders from the statutory, voluntary and independent sectors (averaging 
15 interviews annually). These key informants are selected to have complimentary 
specialist knowledge in the fields of youth, single, family and statutory homelessness, 
as well as offering a balance in terms of sectoral perspective and geographical location. 
All interviews are audio-recorded, with informed consent, and fully transcribed before 
being thematically analysed. While we interview largely the same core group of key 
informants each year in order to track their (well-informed) views of policy and 
economic impacts as they unfold over time, we also select a specific theme each year 
to subject to a particularly ‘deep dive’. Particularly pertinent to the present article is 
that in 2016/17 (Fitzpatrick et al, 2017), localism was selected as that year’s theme, with 
both the selection of key informants and interview topic guide tailored accordingly.
Another core element of the study is an analysis of official rough-sleeping estimates, 
together with statistics on ‘statutory’ homelessness (see later), as well as a range of 
household surveys containing data relevant to homelessness. To tap into front-line 
practitioner perspectives, we also undertake an annual online survey of England’s 326 
local authorities, targeting homelessness service managers, and achieving response 
rates of 43–57 per cent. This level of participation has tended to increase over time 
and represents a creditable level of engagement for an entirely voluntary survey. In 
each of the five years in which the survey has run, respondents have included a wide 
spread of local authorities in terms of regional location, size, political complexion and 
homelessness rates. Moreover, since there is a significant turnover each year in which 
specific councils respond to the survey, we have captured the perspective of a very large 
proportion of all English local authorities over the course of the study. This has enabled 
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us to delve beneath the official statistics to enhance understanding of how housing 
market change, welfare reforms and other key policy developments have impacted on 
homelessness trends and responses at the local level. The survey comprises both closed 
and open-ended questions, generating rich qualitative as well as quantitative data.
This article thus benefits from a methodology that has been devised to offer 
a comprehensive and longitudinal view of homelessness developments, enabling 
their situation in a wider policy and structural context. The research gained ethical 
approval from Heriot-Watt University Ethics Committee before the commencement 
of fieldwork in 2011, and this has been kept under review ever since, with specific 
attention given to the ongoing ethical challenges inherent in maintaining the 
anonymity of a relatively small number of high-profile senior stakeholders who would 
be potentially recognisable within the field were it not for the efforts that we make 
to disguise their identity in all published outputs.
Consistent with UK traditions (Fitzpatrick et al, 2009), the research adopts a broad 
definition of homelessness. Thus, we cover not only people sleeping rough, but also 
residents of hostels, refuges, bed-and-breakfast (B&B) hotels and other temporary 
accommodation, as well as households that English local authorities are legally obliged 
to rehouse as ‘statutorily homeless’, that is, assessed as homeless and in ‘priority need’ 
(mainly families with children and vulnerable adults). This statutory homelessness 
system has been a core part of the national English (indeed, wider British) welfare state 
since 1977, and we return to discuss it further later (Fitzpatrick and Pawson, 2016).
The problem: rising homelessness
Elected in 2010 on a platform of public spending austerity, the Conservative–Liberal 
Democrat UK Coalition government immediately embarked on a radical welfare and 
housing reform programme, with a particular focus on cuts to housing allowances 
for private tenants (Fitzpatrick et al, 2011). All enumerated forms of homelessness 
subsequently escalated in England, including rough sleeping, which has more 
than doubled since 2010 according to official numbers (see Figure 1). While these 
Figure 1: Trends in local authority rough-sleeper estimates by broad region, 2004–19
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rough-sleeping statistics have some well-documented methodological weaknesses 
(UK Statistics Authority, 2015), the direction of travel has been clear, albeit that this 
trend began to reverse from 2018.
At the same time, there has also been an upward trajectory in statutory homelessness 
numbers in England since 2010 (see Figure 2), concentrated in London and the South 
(see Figure 3), almost all of which can be attributed to an extraordinary increase 
in private tenancy terminations (see Figure 4). Even as the rising tide of statutory 
homelessness acceptances may have recently lost some momentum, temporary 
accommodation placements have continued to grow (see Figure 5) as local authorities 
have faced an intensifying shortage of suitable and affordable rehousing opportunities 
for families entitled to rehousing (Stephens et al, 2019).
Growing homelessness in England is, we would argue, the result of deliberate policy 
choices rather than the post-2008 recession: previous recessions have not necessarily 
witnessed a rise in homelessness (Fitzpatrick et al, 2011). What has been particularly 
‘toxic’ in recent years has been the combination of an increasingly pressurised housing 
market in London and the South of England, and the intensification of welfare benefit 
restrictions. In our annual survey of English local authorities in 2015, 93 per cent of 
London boroughs, as compared with 49 per cent of Northern local authorities, reported 
that post-2010 benefit cuts had increased homelessness in their area (Fitzpatrick et al, 
2016). This analysis is consistent with quantitative modelling evidence that:
The most important driver of homelessness in all its forms is poverty…. 
Other drivers include availability and affordability of accommodation, the 
extent to which prevention measures are used, and the demographics of 
people experiencing homelessness…. [C]essation of welfare cuts and focused 
prevention activity can make an impact on … homelessness but this is limited 
if not accompanied by investment in affordable and accessible housing supply. 
(Bramley, 2017: 1)
Figure 2: Statutory homelessness assessment decisions, 2008/09–17/18
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Figure 3: Homelessness acceptances, 2008/09–17/18: trends at broad region level – in-
dexed
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Figure 4: Change in number of households made homeless due to selected immediate 
causes, 2008/09–17/18 – indexed
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Highly relevant here, then is a continuing decline in the availability of social housing, 
with the net annual flow of vacancies having halved over the past 20 years (Stephens 
et al, 2019). Bramley’s (2017) conclusions are also consistent with a National Audit 
Office (2017: 7) assessment that ‘Changes to Local Housing Allowance are likely to 
have contributed to the affordability of tenancies for those on benefits, and are an 
element of the increase in homelessness.’ Moreover, the head of the National Audit 
Office commented that:
‘Homelessness in all its forms has significantly increased in recent years…. 
Despite this, government has not evaluated the impact of its reforms on this 
issue, and there remain gaps in its approach. It is difficult to understand why 
the Department persisted with its light touch approach in the face of such 
a visibly growing problem.’ 
Subsequently, the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts described 
homelessness in England as a ‘national crisis’ and chided the Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Local Government for its ‘unacceptably complacent’ stance on the 
problem (House of Commons, 2017).
It is this article’s contention that this apparent ‘complacency’ arises directly from the 
political commitment of post-2010 UK governments to localism. Moreover, we argue 
that alongside the austerity-driven social security cuts and housing market pressures 
just discussed, the policy and ideology of localism has played an independent and 
malign role in shaping England’s recent homelessness trajectory. Next, we reflect on 
the theory and practice of localism in this context, before moving on to consider its 
associated homelessness impacts.
Figure 5: Local authorities’ use of temporary accommodation for homeless households
-500
 500
 1,500
 2,500
 3,500
 4,500
 5,500
 6,500
 7,500
0
10,000
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
20
19
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
N
o
 o
f 
p
la
ce
m
en
ts
 a
t 
31
 M
ar
ch
N
o
 o
f 
p
la
ce
m
en
ts
 a
t 
31
 M
ar
ch
All temporary accommodation (left hand axis)
B&B hotels (right hand axis)
Source: Fitzpatrick et al (2019). Source material from MHCLG published statistics.
Suzanne Fitzpatrick et al
8
Localism: the solution?
For too long, central government has hoarded and concentrated power. 
Trying to improve people’s lives by imposing decisions, setting targets and 
demanding inspections from Whitehall simply doesn’t work…. It leaves no 
room for adaptation to reflect local circumstances or innovation to deliver 
services more effectively and at lower cost. And it leaves people feeling ‘done 
to’ and imposed upon – the very opposite of the sense of participation and 
involvement on which a healthy democracy thrives…. This is the essence 
of the Big Society…. We are breaking down the barriers that stop councils, 
local charities, social enterprises and voluntary groups getting things done for 
themselves. (Department for Communities and Local Government (2011))
The localism agenda of the 2010 Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition 
government was anchored in a decentralisation ideology shared by both parties (Deas, 
2013). With deep roots in communitarian social and political thought (Etzioni, 1998), 
which had inspired a limited ‘new localist’ policy direction at the end of the Labour 
government under Gordon Brown (Turner, 2019), David Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ 
programme was portrayed as a decisive rejection of old-fashioned, statist styles of 
governance (Jacobs and Manzi, 2013) in favour of Burkean ‘little platoons’ undertaking 
collective forms of (voluntary) social action (Clarke and Cochrane, 2013). While 
there were continuities with New Labour’s ‘conditional localism’ (Hildreth, 2011), a 
key distinction was the Coalition government’s enthusiasm for ‘actively dismantling 
(rather than reforming) parts of the state’ (Deas, 2013: 73).
Thus, key to these linked Conservative and Liberal agendas was the retreat of 
central government, giving other stakeholders – local authorities but also voluntary 
and community groups, and faith-based organisations – space to play a bigger role in 
public welfare (Deas, 2013). The highest-profile example has been food banks, the use 
of which has grown exponentially in recent years (Sosenko et al, 2019), with David 
Cameron describing food-bank volunteers as ‘part of what I call the Big Society’ 
(Mulholland, 2012). Here, Conservative agendas focused on bolstering personal and 
civic responsibility (McKee, 2015), dovetailed neatly with traditional Liberal Democrat 
concerns with ‘community politics’ (Hildreth, 2011) and devolved forms of governance 
(Dorey and Garnett, 2016). As one vocal supporter of localism commented: 
‘Eric Pickles [the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government 
under the Coalition government] … announced his arrival in the Department 
by claiming he had three priorities for his tenure: localism, localism and 
localism. Liberal Democrat ministers quipped that they would add a fourth 
priority: localism.’ (Cox, 2010: 1) 
Taking as axiomatic that “England [is] one of the most centralized Western democracies” 
(Manzi, 2015), a 2011 parliamentary report opined that: ‘The principle of localism is 
not controversial; it commands cross-party support…. The Government’s approach 
in practice, however, has thus far been marked by inconsistency and incoherence, not 
helped by a definition of localism that is extremely elastic’ (House of Commons, 2011: 3). 
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Tellingly, though, even at this early stage, warnings on this agenda were sounded by 
advocacy organisations, as the parliamentary committee conceded:
There is not universal support for the idea that central government should 
retreat entirely from local affairs, allowing accountability to local people to 
replace performance monitoring from the centre. In particular, organisations 
representing vulnerable, marginalised or minority groups argue that these 
sections of the community need protection that cannot be provided by 
the current mechanisms of local democratic accountability…. National 
minimum service standards, in some form, may be necessary. (House of 
Commons, 2011: 4)
The Localism Act 2011 gave legal form to the Coalition’s core localist ethos – that 
central government should largely absent itself from direct involvement in issues 
such as homelessness – and, at the same time, incorporated substantive elements 
highly relevant to homelessness service delivery. This included new powers for social 
landlords to grant fixed-term tenancies, rather than traditional open-ended tenancies, 
and enabled local authorities to restrict access to their housing waiting lists through 
locally defined eligibility rules, for example, excluding aspiring applicants on the 
grounds of age, residency, work-search activity or a ‘poor tenancy record’. Crucially, 
councils could also now elect to discharge their statutory rehousing duty to homeless 
households via the offer of a fixed-term private, rather than social, tenancy. Another 
key homelessness-relevant measure incorporated within this localism agenda – albeit 
introduced in the final phase of the predecessor Labour government – was the 2009 
removal of the ring fence for ‘Supporting People’ funding. This underpins local 
authority provision of housing-related support that helps homeless people and other 
vulnerable groups sustain their accommodation. Since then, authorities have been free 
to divert this money to other priorities (Turner, 2019). The Housing and Planning Act 
2016, subsequently passed under the Cameron-led Conservative government, sought 
to impose on local authorities fixed-term tenancies and other measures originally 
promoted as local ‘flexibilities’; however, the May-led Conservative administration 
backed off from this coercive stance in the radically changed political climate after 
the Grenfell Tower fire disaster (Stephens et al, 2019).
Over the past decade, the localisation of key policy and practice frameworks has 
been evident not only in the housing and homelessness arena, but also in welfare 
benefits, particularly at the emergency end of the spectrum (Social Security Advisory 
Committee, 2015). Three crucial measures stand out here. The first has been the 
greatly expanded budget for Discretionary Housing Payments, affording local 
authorities substantial funds for autonomously determined welfare expenditure to 
(very partially) mitigate mainstream housing allowance cuts. Discretionary housing 
payment allocations to councils were ramped up from £30 million in 2011/12 to 
£165 million in 2014/15, which is a measure interpreted by Turner (2019: 60; see 
also Meers, 2019) as enabling ministers to ‘shift some responsibility for the effects of 
its decisions to local authorities’.
Second, the discretionary Social Fund – cash payments to very low-income 
households in crisis situations – was abolished in 2013 and replaced by a power (but 
not a duty) for local authorities to establish their own local welfare assistance schemes. 
Initially, funding for these local schemes was identified, though not ring-fenced, 
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within the central government revenue support grant to local authorities. In 2017/18, 
this budget line disappeared altogether in the local government funding settlement 
(Gibbons, 2017).
Third, also in 2013, the national Council Tax Benefit scheme was replaced by 
locally determined ‘council tax reduction schemes’, along with a 10 per cent overall 
budget cut. Associated protections stipulated for pensioner households meant that 
this effectively amounted to a 20 per cent cut in funds available for ‘unprotected’ 
working-age claimants.
It is important to acknowledge that key elements of the national welfare 
framework remained in place even after these changes were implemented, including a 
(weakened) national system of income maintenance benefits and an (altered) statutory 
homelessness system. Some counter-localisation trends were also evident, most notably, 
local authorities lost their role in the administration of housing allowances with the 
roll-out of the new, simplified, working-age benefit ‘Universal Credit’. However, the 
combined impact of the housing and welfare changes outlined earlier was, we would 
argue, to significantly elevate the role played by English councils and other local actors 
in determining the scale, nature and generosity of the emergency help available to 
impoverished and vulnerable groups. We now turn to look at the interrelationship 
between this encroaching localism and increasing homelessness across England.
The homelessness impacts of localism
National-level key informants interviewed in our study over the past decade have 
been consistently critical of localism’s impacts on homelessness. Their core concern 
has been the central government’s post-2010 vacation of this policy space, which 
some have characterised as a ‘dereliction of duty’ (Maclennan and O’Sullivan, 2013):
‘Eric Pickles … was very clear that everything was about localism and it 
wasn’t the role of government to support, interfere or have anything to 
do with how local authorities delivered on the ground…. That mantra of 
localism … has its place … but the way it was taken and interpreted by [the 
government] has been a disaster for homelessness. It means that the structural 
changes that needed to be put in place to manage and go forward … didn’t 
happen.’ (Independent key informant, 2017)
While acknowledging that a range of targeted homelessness initiatives have been 
supported by successive austerity-era Westminster governments, informants generally 
perceived an absence of strategic direction or leverage over homelessness practice. As 
also noted by the National Audit Office (2017), this contrasts with earlier phases of 
rising homelessness – for example, the late 1980s and late 1990s – when Westminster 
took a highly assertive and often successful (if sometimes controversial) stance on 
homelessness:
‘I use the example of under the Blair government and the Social Exclusion 
Unit appointing Louise Casey as the [homelessness] “tsar”. Whether you 
agree with it or not … it gets [things] done … and we cut rough sleeping 
by two thirds because somebody [was] allowed – given permission and given 
authority and power – to do it.’ (Statutory sector key informant, 2017)
The limits of localism
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‘when we’ve tackled homelessness in the past, we’ve done it in collaboration 
between central, local and voluntary sector providers, and we’ve done it with 
a strong sense of target and a strong sense of direction. The government, 
over the last few years, have not had a sense of direction, and a lot of the 
money that they’ve thrown towards it has been singular funded streams but 
with no sense of coherence across the top of them…. What we know from 
our work around the country is that local areas do look to government for 
leadership on this stuff.’ (Voluntary sector key informant, 2017)
Echoing the parliamentary evidence referenced earlier, we encountered a particularly 
intense critique of post-2010 localism from single homelessness service providers, 
who, from the very start, feared that the withdrawal of central government from this 
policy arena would seriously disadvantage their clients: 
‘You need a national framework and to work flexibly within it locally. If 
councils are not told by government what to do … the Not in My Back 
Garden idea … I worry about giving everything to local councillors.’ 
(voluntary sector key informant, 2012) 
Alongside this overarching concern about the lack of centralised policy direction 
on homelessness, specific measures implemented under the localist rubric also raised 
concerns among voluntary sector key informants and sometimes also local authority 
homelessness officers.
Foremost among these were the new powers that local authorities gained under 
the Localism Act 2011 to restrict eligibility to the social housing waiting list. While 
statutorily homeless households should, by law, have subsequently continued to receive 
reasonable preference in council housing allocations, there is evidence from case law 
that some councils started to use their new powers to unlawfully exclude them from 
their housing lists.2 Key informant testimony indicated that such restrictions were 
sometimes even applied to women and children fleeing domestic violence:
‘in some areas, you have to have lived there for five years before you are 
eligible for a local authority property…. We’ve tried to argue … that women 
experiencing domestic violence shouldn’t have had to live in that borough 
for that amount of time.’ (voluntary sector key informant, 2014)
Some local authority survey respondents confirmed the existence of these unlawful 
practices: 
‘We have a five-year residency rule which means 50 per cent of homeless 
families cannot apply for social housing.’ (local authority respondent, the 
South, 2016)
Voluntary sector concern that local authorities’ ability to meet their legal duties 
by rehousing people in the private rather than social rented sector would deter 
applications for assistance seemed confirmed by some of what local authorities had 
to say (see also Turner, 2019):
Suzanne Fitzpatrick et al
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‘What … had a big impact on our statutory homeless numbers is that we 
adopted the Localism Act power to discharge duty with a single private rented 
offer. And just the threat of that in our Housing Options discussions with 
customers at an initial stage has been sufficient to divert even more families 
away from the statutory route.’ (Local authority respondent, London, 2014)
A few local authorities saw the fixed-term social tenancies enabled under the 2011 Act 
as having positive homelessness impacts: “The introduction of fixed-term tenancies 
may result in more properties being available to homeless households if fixed-term 
tenancies are not extended” (local authority respondent, the South, 2016). However, 
the balance of local authority opinion was that their effects would be negative: “It 
is unclear what will happen to tenants on time-limited tenancies…. Some may 
face repeat homelessness at the end of the period” (local authority respondent, the 
South, 2016); “The ending of secure social tenancies is likely to see an increase in 
homelessness in the future” (local authority respondent, the North, 2016). Some local 
authorities emphasised what was seen as the beneficially increased scope for the local 
coordination of welfare funds:
‘Having locally determined forms of welfare such as Discretionary Housing 
Payments, local welfare assistance funds, has helped us to target these funds 
to preventing and relieving homelessness. Bringing together this type of 
support, budgeting, employment and homelessness support, has enabled us to 
stabilise households’ position more effectively.’ (Local authority respondent, 
London, 2016)
However, the growing reliance on these discretionary, budget-limited schemes was 
more often viewed negatively by local authority homelessness managers, as well as 
by national key informants: “More groups of people now reliant on Discretionary 
Housing Payments due to [welfare] cuts. There is no funding for local welfare assistance 
funds. Council Tax Support scheme changed eligibility which reduced … access” 
(local authority respondent, the South, 2016). It should be noted here that without a 
statutory duty to provide a local welfare assistance fund, many cash-strapped English 
local authorities have now closed or severely reduced their emergency welfare schemes 
(Gibbons, 2017). As revealed by our 2018 survey, in almost one fifth (18 per cent) of 
all English councils, these funds had entirely disappeared: “[Name of county council] 
decided to abandon this scheme. Seven local authorities are affected by this decision. 
There has been no replacement” (local authority respondent, the South, 2018). The 
direction of travel has been similar, if not quite as catastrophic, with Council Tax 
Benefit schemes (Turner, 2019).
However, most serious of all for homeless people has probably been the loss of the 
ring-fenced Supporting People funds:
‘I think there are some positive aspects to localism affording communities 
greater involvement in decision-making but equally there are negatives, such 
as allowing councils to make decisions locally, especially where ring-fenced 
money has been concerned as this is no longer spent as intended in our 
area, such as the Supporting People grant.’ (Local authority respondent, the 
Midlands, 2016)
The limits of localism
13
Such concerns were rejected by the then Secretary of State, Eric Pickles, in evidence 
to the 2011 Select Committee inquiry:
I am aware of some places in the country that are taking significant cuts in 
Supporting People – I completely deprecate that. But most local authorities 
are protecting the scheme, not just to help vulnerable people but because it 
also makes enormous economic sense. One of the consequences of localism is 
that you have to allow local communities to make decisions about where that 
spending goes. Most sensible local authorities will come to the conclusion that 
£1 spent on Supporting People will probably save them £5 or £6 further 
down the line.… It would be a brave local authority that cut Supporting 
People. (House of Commons, 2011: 27)
In reality, between 2010/11 and 2018/19, English local authorities reduced Supporting 
People expenditure by 78 per cent in real terms.3 The minister’s 2011 comments are 
thus revealed as naive at best. The devastating impact of the loss of Supporting People 
funding for, in particular, single homelessness services has been widely reported on, 
not least in successive annual reports by the umbrella organisation Homeless Link 
(2015b) and a highly critical report by the National Audit Office (2017).
Is the problem localism or austerity?
Many policy analysts might argue at this point that, surely, the homelessness-related 
concerns articulated earlier, especially the cuts in various forms of funding, should 
be attributed to overall public spending contraction, not to localism specifically. 
Councils have certainly borne the brunt of austerity-related funding cuts, with the 
most deprived local authorities tending to be the hardest hit (Hastings et al, 2017). 
An estimated £5 billion less was spent by local authorities on homelessness-related 
activities between 2008/09 and 2017/18 than would have been the case had funding 
continued at 2008/09 levels (Thunder and Rose, 2019), and this at a time when 
homelessness numbers rose sharply.
We would therefore readily acknowledge the devastating impacts of austerity on 
the support available to people at risk of homelessness since 2010. It is also clear that 
localism is sometimes used as a tool to help deliver on austerity, with the ‘cutting and 
devolving’ of budgets formerly the responsibility of central government, sometimes 
as an antecedent to eliminating them altogether, being a well-evidenced political 
stratagem to mute opposition and/or deflect blame (Costa-Font and Greer, 2013; 
Meers, 2019; Turner, 2019). A clear post-2010 example of such ‘policy dumping’ 
(Maclennan and O’Sullivan, 2013) has been the lamentable fate of the discretionary 
Social Fund in England, as noted earlier.
We nevertheless contend that there are effects that are intrinsic to the logic of 
localism that will tend to have deleterious impacts on homeless people and other 
marginalised groups even outside of a period of austerity, albeit that these effects are 
often amplified by simultaneous public expenditure cuts. First, localism inappropriately 
and unfairly places primary responsibility for tackling structurally driven social 
problems on local actors who have no direct leverage over the relevant welfare 
policies and public expenditure decisions. This is one example of what Clarke and 
Cochrane (2013: 14) term the ‘non-autonomous’ nature of local needs, which very 
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often result from ‘decisions made far beyond local borders’. Of course, this observation 
is consistent with the idea that some local authorities may be more able or motivated 
than others to mitigate the impacts of these damaging national decisions (Watts et al, 
2019). Moreover, while the prevalence of a localist agenda does not prevent central 
government from addressing the structural causes of homelessness, it may well 
help facilitate the avoidance of doing so by providing convenient ‘cover’ for either 
deleterious actions (such as ‘stealthy’ welfare cuts) or simply inaction: “Localism was 
merely the government’s way of absolving itself of any responsibility for housing and 
homelessness” (local authority respondent, the South, 2016).
Second, by definition, the localisation of the homelessness policymaking function 
brings about a diffusion of expertise across a very large number of, often very small, 
local authorities, who may lack any specialist capacity in this field. This extreme 
fragmentation of policymaking functions also poses significant challenges for those 
seeking to influence policy and practice in progressive directions for marginalised 
groups. While innovations may often emerge in a bottom-up fashion – as with 
‘Housing Options’ approaches to homelessness prevention, for example (Pawson, 
2007) – the scaling up of such approaches ultimately relies on central government 
stewardship. It is no coincidence that major steps forward on homelessness have 
almost always required the deployment of the legal, financial and regulatory levers 
that the government uniquely has at its disposal. Key examples from England include 
the two thirds reduction in rough sleeping between 1999 and 2002, and the 50 per 
cent reduction in temporary accommodation placements between 2003 and 2010 
(Fitzpatrick et al, 2011). So too in other countries: the much-lauded ‘Housing First’-
based Finnish drive to end homelessness (Pleace et al, 2015) and the abolition of 
the priority need criterion in Scotland, such that virtually all homeless people are 
now entitled to settled rehousing, both emerged from national programmes driven 
by state-led ‘progressive elites’ (Fitzpatrick and Pawson, 2016). In contrast, relying 
on hundreds of local authorities to identify and adopt well-evidenced new ideas 
means that advances will almost certainly be patchy and slow – with a significant and 
inefficient ‘drag’ on progress exerted by laggards. Of course, in the English case, this 
is to some extent deliberate, with localism motivated, in part, by ‘a rejection of the 
rational, evidence-based approach … central to the politics of the previous Labour 
administration’ (Deas, 2013: 67).
Third, increasingly localised housing and welfare responses, especially – but not 
only – in times of budget stringency, will often make it more difficult for those 
without a ‘local connection’ to access the help they need. The Social Security Advisory 
Committee (2015), for example, reported that councils in the post-2011 period 
were increasingly requiring commissioned service providers, including Women’s 
Aid, to ‘gatekeep’ on their behalf by obliging them to exclude those without a local 
connection. Turner (2019) reports that many local authorities utilised 2011 Act 
powers to exclude those lacking a local connection from their housing waiting lists, 
including, as we saw earlier, some statutorily homeless households. This was confirmed 
by local authorities in our annual survey: “More control over Housing Register has 
been good and enabled us to prioritise local people” (local authority, the South, 
2016). Similarly, the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (House of 
Commons, 2016) has expressed concern about the application of ‘local connection’ 
requirements to access local welfare assistance schemes. The direction of travel is thus 
very clear and perfectly logical: the more localised the welfare and housing safety net 
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is, the more likely it is that vulnerable groups who are mobile between local authority 
areas (for example, women fleeing violence) will be excluded from assistance as local 
authorities face both fiscal and political incentives to restrict local services to ‘local 
people’ (Turner, 2019).
Fourth, ‘unpopular’ groups such as homeless people, especially those with complex 
support needs, are vulnerable to marginalisation in decentralised systems, which 
can leave politically invisible or geographically dispersed groups ‘at the mercy of 
the vagaries of local politics and funding choices made under the pressure of cuts’ 
(House of Commons, 2011: 28). Turner (2019: 14) has adroitly noted that ‘in such 
circumstances (high potential savings, low political costs), localization is highly likely 
to lead to reductions in the entitlements of small and relatively vulnerable groups 
within local populations’. One supported housing provider made this plain to the 
parliamentary inquiry on localism in 2011:
Services like ours, which are mainly about providing support and 
accommodation for chronic alcoholics and drug addicts, are seen by many as 
helping people who do not deserve help.… [A]t election time, the candidate 
who announced that his policy was to close hostels for alcoholics and drug 
addicts, to get rid of inmates and cut the council tax, might stand a good 
chance of dislodging a responsible councillor from his seat in a marginal 
ward. (House of Commons, 2011: 28)
While such concerns are certainly heightened during periods of austerity and budget 
cuts, there is no reason to suppose that they are limited to these contexts. For one 
thing, they extend beyond matters of resource allocation and also pertain to local 
resistance to the presence of, and provision for, ‘undeserving’ groups (see also Matthews 
et al, 2015). As one single homelessness service senior manager commented to us: “as 
a pan-London organisation, we represent a community of identity, not a geographic 
community, and focus on geographic community will always disadvantage us”. He 
went on to say that “communities are by definition exclusive” and will tend to exclude 
his clients who “don’t fit and obviously don’t fit”. The umbrella organisation Homeless 
Link (2015a: 10) has likewise highlighted ways in which localism can unhelpfully 
open up single homelessness services to community scrutiny, as well as to budget 
cuts: ‘We have learnt from the experience of increased localism that investment can 
be diverted away from population groups [lacking] statutory protection, and … also 
among the least popular locally – such as single people who are homeless or sleeping 
rough.’  The validity of these concerns has, of course, been substantiated in spectacular 
fashion by the massively disproportionate cuts made to Supporting People expenditure 
by English local authorities (see also Turner, 2019).
Fifth, and most fundamentally, the weakening of the national floor of entitlement-
based protection in favour of locally determined, variable levels of assistance 
introduces, for us, a morally unsupportable level of horizontal inequity in the meeting 
of vulnerable citizens’ fundamental needs (Doyal and Gough, 1991). As the Social 
Security Advisory Committee (2015: 47) commented:
shifting the balance away from national policies and national minimum 
standards brings with it a greater risk not just of unacceptable variation in 
practice but of inequality in standards and outcomes. While it can be argued 
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that varying inputs and delivery methods at the local level can reflect different 
local needs and circumstances, some of our stakeholders maintained that this 
should not undermine a fundamental commitment to the achievement of 
similar or equivalent outcomes based on common citizenship.
While it is, of course, vital that national programmes are tailored to (objectively 
varying) local conditions, it is simply not safe to assume that local ‘folk … know what’s 
best’ (Eric Pickles, quoted in Clarke and Cochrane, 2013: 20) for homeless people 
with complex support needs, and this includes well-intentioned local voluntary and 
community organisations. Far from necessarily being a progressive force for good, some 
‘path-dependent’ voluntary sector actors, many of them faith-based and providing 
rudimentary and even damaging types of support, can be significant barriers to progress 
in the homelessness field, whose opposition to radical reform has to be overcome 
with national, evidence-based initiatives (Parsell and Watts, 2017).
Last, but certainly not least, the indignity and disempowerment intrinsic to reliance 
on (local) discretionary rather than (national) entitlement-based assistance must be 
recognised (see also Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018):
‘The insidious nature of [Discretionary Housing Payments] has not been 
highlighted enough in moving away from a social security system that is 
governed by universal regulation and based on need. People should be 
able to rely on a basic level of support whatever the circumstances…. It is 
demeaning and stressful for recipients to go “cap in hand” to a local official.’ 
(Local authority respondent, the South, 2015)
Conclusions
This article started from the premise that rising homelessness post-2010 resulted largely 
from welfare reform and housing market pressures, which are themselves the outcome 
of deliberate (and avoidable) policy choices by central government. However, we 
would also insist that the ideology and practice of localism has made a bad situation 
worse – enabling central government to evade responsibility for the consequences of 
its actions, and leaving cash-strapped, ill-equipped local authorities, and increasingly 
civil society actors, to pick up the pieces of what has become a national homelessness 
crisis. The ‘patchy retrenchment’ (Turner, 2019: 61) that localism has wrought in 
housing and welfare responses across England has weakened the emergency support 
available to vulnerable households, consequently contributing to rising homelessness.
While we have focused here on a single case study drawn from a period of austerity, 
our contention is that the underlying logic of our argument extends its resonance 
much further. In particular, we would posit that the ‘conservative communitarianism’ 
(Davies, 2008) intrinsic to localism means that even in times of rising budgets, and 
in varying political contexts, this model has a necessary tendency (Sayer, 2000) to 
be highly problematic for relatively small, marginalised and unpopular populations 
whose interests are imperilled in the cut and thrust of local politics. Admittedly, New 
Labour’s ‘predilection for centralism’ may well have precipitated the beginning of a 
localist reaction before the Coalition took office (Maclennan and O’Sullivan, 2013: 
608). Nevertheless, at least when it comes to homelessness, the outcomes of New 
Labour’s centralising tendencies were, on balance, strongly (albeit not uniformly) 
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positive (Fitzpatrick et al, 2009). This is also in keeping with experiences in other 
countries, where effective measures on homelessness almost always require a strong 
steer from central or large-scale federal government (Fitzpatrick et al, 2012). Thus, 
the alarming rise in homelessness in England, and the deleterious role played by 
localism therein, can and should be laid at the door of Liberal Democrat ‘community 
politics’ as much as Conservative anti-state, anti-redistributive and pro-charity ‘Big 
Society’ ideology.
Particularly in the current anti-elitist climate, it contradicts the populist zeitgeist to 
say so, but sometimes the ‘woman/man in Whitehall does know best’ – as they have 
the research evidence, policy knowledge, money, leverage, targets and performance 
framework needed to enable positive change. The extent to which local stakeholders 
welcomed rather than resented proactive central government support – and often 
direction – on homelessness is striking from the quantitative and qualitative data that 
we have collected over the past decade. How this is done is crucial: inflexible diktats 
from generalist civil servants with no specialist knowledge on homelessness are, of 
course, likely to be both unwelcome and ineffective. However, hands-on support 
from specialist homelessness advisors – for example, seconded experts well versed 
in the pressures that local authorities face, and with the ability to adapt their highly 
‘granular’ advice to the complex realities on the ground – is quite a different matter.
Clearly, in this field as in many others, a balance must be struck between flexibility to 
accommodate varying local conditions, and national minimum standards. It would be 
disingenuous to maintain that there were no positive outcomes of localism over the past 
decade. Certainly, some imaginative councils, with progressive political backing, used these 
flexibilities to align (dwindling) resources as effectively as possible to local conditions (Watts 
et al, 2019). It may also be that city-regions offer a more suitable (larger) scale for local 
coordinated efforts to address homelessness (Costa-Font and Greer, 2013).
However, the overall message of this article is that strong central government 
leadership and accountability is needed to drive positive change on homelessness – or 
even just to stabilise a deteriorating situation. Successive Coalition and Conservative 
governments may have hoped that localising homelessness responses would make the 
crisis ‘less conspicuous’ (Jacobs and Manzi, 2013: 39) but the unmistakably growing 
numbers on the streets, reinforced by public and media concerns about the deaths of 
homeless people (Office for National Statistics, 2018), put paid to that. This prompted 
something of a retreat from localism under the later stages of the May government, 
which introduced a new national strategy on rough sleeping (Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Local Government, 2018), and also supported the passage of the 
Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, which originated as a Private Member’s Bill. The 
positive impacts of these central government actions can at least arguably be seen in 
the recent plateauing of homelessness and rough sleeping captured in Figures 1–4 
earlier; however, it will take some considerable time to dial back the damaging effects 
of almost a decade of localism compounding austerity. Interestingly, the current 
Conservative Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, has recently appointed Tony Blair’s 
original ‘homelessness czar’ (Louise Casey) to conduct a review of rough sleeping 
in England in a move that seems to take us back full circle to the time before the 
disaster that has been localism in this field.4
Geographical variability driven by local political priorities and expediency may be 
acceptable, even desirable, in some areas of public policy to bolster local democracy 
(Davies, 2008) and to align local policies with citizens’ preferences (Turner, 2019). 
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However, we would contend that localism was always an obviously dangerous 
strategy on issues like homelessness and crisis welfare provision, which concern 
the fundamental needs of a marginalised population. As a concept, it is all the more 
dangerous because it is seductive to at least some on the Centre-Left, in the name of 
democratisation and the decentralisation of power, as well as those on the Right, always 
keen to find ways to shrink the state and expand the role of civil society, including 
faith groups, in assisting low-income households in an explicit throwback to the 
pre-welfare state era (Clarke and Cochrane, 2013). The disastrous consequences of 
localism for homelessness were predictable, and, indeed, predicted (Fitzpatrick et al, 
2011), and should make those considering themselves progressives wary of unqualified 
support for community-oriented, decentralised policy approaches in this sort of field.
Widening our argument beyond the immediate homelessness case, we would contend 
that a number of core criteria can be extracted from our analysis for more general 
deployment in determining the appropriate scale for social policy formulation. In our 
view, policymakers should ask themselves the following three key questions. First, do the 
relevant powers and duties impinge on people’s ability to meet their most fundamental 
material needs, such as for food, shelter and warmth? Second, do they impact mainly 
or disproportionately on especially marginalised, unpopular, geographically dispersed 
or mobile populations? Third, do they pertain to specialist areas of public policy, where 
local expertise on evidence-based approaches may well be wanting? If the answer to 
any or all of these questions is ‘yes’, then localised approaches are highly likely to be 
both iniquitous and inefficient, and a centralised approach has much to commend it.
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